Case 1

NIST CFReDS Hacking Case: Windows XP disk image

Examined the NIST CFReDS Windows XP image in Magnet AXIOM and Wireshark. Tool execution and a recovered packet capture are confirmed; unauthorized intrusion is not established.

Tools
Magnet AXIOM · Wireshark · PowerShell
Category
Computer · Windows

Case CASE-009: Greg Schardt Hacking Case

NIST CFReDS Windows XP disk image examination.

Item Value
Examiner Turki Adnan Abbas · تركي عدنان عباس
Evidence 4Dell Latitude CPi.E01 (multi-segment E01 set)
Primary tools Magnet AXIOM Examine 7.8, Wireshark, PowerShell
Time standard UTC (AXIOM display configured UTC+00:00)

Executive conclusion

The examination identified a Windows XP system registered to Greg Schardt and a local administrative user profile named Mr. Evil. The system contained network discovery, traffic-capture, password-recovery, and remote-access tools. Prefetch artifacts support execution of Cain and Ethereal. A valid packet capture recovered from the Mr. Evil profile records HTTP traffic, including a Hotmail form submission for which the application returned “Message sent!”.

These combined findings support network reconnaissance and packet-capture activity. The acquired evidence does not, by itself, prove an unauthorized compromise of a third-party host, credential theft, or delivery of the captured email to its destination mailbox. The CFReDS case is a training/reference scenario; allegations in the case description are treated as hypotheses rather than established facts.

Assessment Determination
Use of network/security tooling Supported by application files and Prefetch
Captured network communications Confirmed by recovered PCAP
Hotmail submission acknowledged Confirmed by application response
Successful unauthorized intrusion Not established from examined evidence

1. Scope and evidence handling

The examination reviewed the supplied forensic disk image through Magnet AXIOM artifacts and file-system views, examined a user-profile packet capture in Wireshark, and correlated the results with Windows Registry, Prefetch, shortcut, browser-history, and Recycle Bin artifacts. Findings are attributed to their originating artifact rather than to a person merely by naming convention.

Item Value
Case identifier CASE-009
Evidence identifier 4Dell Latitude CPi.E01
Primary NTFS partition Approximately 4.53 GB
Operating system Microsoft Windows XP 5.1, build 2600
Recovered capture Documents and Settings\Mr. Evil\interception
PCAP SHA-256 2e24e6ef3d71602d7c091b9c55649f900b908f1e8e648bad48283d4b98d38848
SecEvent.Evt export SHA-256 69e8d6daf3a51780bb4adeef4190622bec003468c8206724be8c0c560f4d5484

Hash scope: the two SHA-256 values above apply only to the separately exported PCAP and SecEvent.Evt, respectively. A whole-image acquisition hash was not independently verified during this examination. Source screenshot timestamps are expressed as displayed by AXIOM in UTC+00:00; file-system times should not be silently treated as local Central time.

Figure 1

Operating system information in the AXIOM evidence image

Operating system information in the AXIOM evidence image
File
01-os-information.png · 181.8 KB
SHA-256
b9597bdb9f7c1ca912dffb0dde2f20ee25ca227cab7deaca92cca222b97278c4

2. Attribution and user context

The SOFTWARE Registry associates the installed operating system with registered owner Greg Schardt. The SAM/User Accounts artifacts identify Mr. Evil as an enabled local account with RID 1003 in the Administrators group. The observed user profile directory is Documents and Settings\Mr. Evil. Registry values and user-profile context support account-level attribution, but do not uniquely identify the human actor behind each individual event.

Figure 2

Mr. Evil account attributes and administrative membership

Mr. Evil account attributes and administrative membership
File
02-mr-evil-account.png · 199.3 KB
SHA-256
76d5e2fa7d6006d6105914b268395bce7105a5a4b929419491cce32b7f14c9a2

Figure 3

Configured Central time zone (summer daylight offset differs from UTC display)

Configured Central time zone (summer daylight offset differs from UTC display)
File
03-time-zone.png · 181.7 KB
SHA-256
bc56456abec6304e5dc8dd31476d903c7eb2d666215661ec40fa16992f1327ea

3. Network and security tools

Desktop Tools shortcuts point to Cain, Ethereal, mIRC, NetStumbler, Look@LAN, CuteFTP, and other utilities. The installation of tools alone does not show malicious use. The Prefetch records provide stronger evidence of application execution at the system level; they do not reliably identify the logged-on person who launched an application.

Artifact Observed result
CAIN.EXE Prefetch Run count 2; last run 27 Aug 2004 15:33:03 UTC
ETHEREAL.EXE Prefetch Run count 1; last run 27 Aug 2004 15:34:54 UTC
Cain .LST files Several zero-byte lists; modification times correlate with application activity, not password recovery
EXPLOITATION\Unix dsniff 2.3, WinVNC, john-1.6.tar.gz present
FOOTPRINTING\UNIX unix_hack.tgz, 73,498,201 bytes; toolkit packaging documented by adjacent readme

Figure 4

Cain Prefetch execution count and last run

Cain Prefetch execution count and last run
File
04-cain-prefetch.png · 233.7 KB
SHA-256
197824a5f8e4493562ba9d33aea6696117d9c28351578e3a55c54726f5d87b95

Figure 5

Ethereal Prefetch execution record

Ethereal Prefetch execution record
File
05-ethereal-prefetch.png · 241.7 KB
SHA-256
052c076d7c29802d1456119605790b01df313d6eecf3f365d4f013fcfdd05768

Figure 6

Offensive-tool archive in the EXPLOITATION directory

Offensive-tool archive in the EXPLOITATION directory
SHA-256
fed486ee4671ee24f06321ba7f66d3e9a1297cc652856151ce529ddfb0e82e97

4. Deleted installation files

Within RECYCLER under the SID ending in 1003, four D*.exe entries were found. The Windows XP INFO2 index recorded their original Desktop paths, identifying the deleted entries as setup executables for network/security tools. Deletion does not demonstrate concealment intent.

Recycled name Original Desktop filename
Dc1.exe lalsetup250.exe
Dc2.exe netstumblerinstaller_0_4_0.exe
Dc3.exe WinPcap_3_01_a.exe
Dc4.exe ethereal-setup-0.10.6.exe

Figure 7

INFO2 preview preserving original paths and filenames

INFO2 preview preserving original paths and filenames
File
07-recycler-info2.png · 197.8 KB
SHA-256
5e3adaf5376c4d9f4c9f8c819b1fb00c105fe56d5c76c5871cf76e2033cea294

5. Network share interaction

A shortcut inside Mr. Evil\Recent resolves to \\4.12.220.254\TEMP, shown in the Windows UI as Temp on m1200. RecentDocs and Shellbags independently reference the same network location. The shortcut contains target-directory metadata and a MAC address 00:02:3F:B3:E5:70. Together these are evidence of interaction with a network-share location, not proof of privilege bypass or transfer of particular files.

Figure 8

LNK target, dates and MAC information for the remote TEMP share

LNK target, dates and MAC information for the remote TEMP share
File
08-lnk-remote-share.png · 155.0 KB
SHA-256
39bb20ffa4440268d7277710e9e0edae0ed2211a03ad99696d93e62e6867a55f

Figure 9

Shellbags record for Temp on m1200 in Mr. Evil NTUSER.DAT

Shellbags record for Temp on m1200 in Mr. Evil NTUSER.DAT
SHA-256
2e2e640f8059f8b751a0b6495a9364d670841ae520182b3929b6b95db70d1481

6. Recovered packet capture and webmail activity

The profile file named interception, without a file extension, is a valid Ethernet PCAP. Packet parsing produced 459 frames spanning approximately 15:36:34 to 15:40:26 UTC on 27 August 2004. Its HTTP traffic primarily involves mobile.msn.com and Passport authentication hosts. The internal HTTP client address 192.168.254.2 is an endpoint visible inside the capture; it is not independently proven to be the seized laptop.

Capture property Observed value
Capture format PCAP, Ethernet link type
Total frames 459
HTTP request count 40, including 38 GET and 2 POST
Principal HTTP client 192.168.254.2
Email submission packet Frame 113, 27 Aug 2004 15:37:55 UTC
Email submission endpoint POST /hm/composeppc.aspx
Recipient rudy@hotmail.com
Subject Hey, This is Mr Evil
Message text Hi. Call me
Response sequence 100 Continue; 302 Found; redirected GET; 200 OK
Application confirmation Message sent!

Interpretation: the response body explicitly confirms that the Hotmail application accepted and reported the message as sent. This is stronger than a redirect alone, but it does not prove delivery to the recipient mailbox. The HTTP headers advertise a Windows CE Pocket PC user agent; this can be spoofed and is not sufficient to prove a physical mobile device. Captured authentication cookies are intentionally excluded from this report.

Figure 10

Wireshark PCAP packet list, including traffic between 192.168.254.2 and 207.68.174.248

Wireshark PCAP packet list, including traffic between 192.168.254.2 and 207.68.174.248
File
10-wireshark-pcap.png · 139.5 KB
SHA-256
4918e854fb8cd9dd50508c5f1100350bf4ccefc2cf4eb9ded402bb6dc08484e4

7. Browser, communications, and external tools

Internet Explorer history attributed to the Mr. Evil profile shows pages associated with network discovery and offensive-security interest, including NetStumbler, WarDriving.com, Ethereal, WinPcap, Anonymizer and 2600. A page title reading “hacking files” is a browser-title artifact, not proof that a local file of that name existed. mIRC channel logs show activity recorded on 20 August 2004, but their content does not establish unauthorized intrusion. Anonymizer keys.txt was referenced by a shortcut whose target was a CD-ROM drive path, not a confirmed file resident on this NTFS partition.

Figure 11

Selected Internet Explorer history pages attributed to Mr. Evil

Selected Internet Explorer history pages attributed to Mr. Evil
File
11-ie-history.png · 258.4 KB
SHA-256
e5bc812e38107d158156e1d1f202f6e34964d0bbbbb3d6357270959c1557c546

Figure 12

Removable-media shortcut to Anonymizer keys.txt

Removable-media shortcut to Anonymizer keys.txt
SHA-256
2c0eb156f599fb704d673a943f696c2e7353baaaed2dc23160da85765d190545

Figure 13

mIRC channel log evidence

mIRC channel log evidence
File
13-mirc-logs.png · 265.8 KB
SHA-256
a1b0a43e3145cda939c530a15c9c24008dd409ad382a7a3a343cc80c2464d780

8. Consolidated event sequence

UTC date and time Correlated observation
20 Aug 2004 15:19 Toolkit archive unix_hack.tgz created in image file system
26 Aug 2004 15:08 Shortcut to remote TEMP share created
27 Aug 2004 15:14 Remote-share shortcut last-access timestamp
27 Aug 2004 15:33:03 CAIN.EXE Prefetch last-run time
27 Aug 2004 15:34:54 ETHEREAL.EXE Prefetch last-run time
27 Aug 2004 15:36:34 to 15:40:26 PCAP network traffic interval
27 Aug 2004 15:37:55 Hotmail POST and server “Message sent!” response
27 Aug 2004 15:41:00 interception file creation/modification timestamp

The temporal proximity of Cain and Ethereal execution to the captured traffic supports a working hypothesis of local network-analysis activity. It does not, without process-level provenance, prove which tool wrote the PCAP or who was operating the keyboard.

9. Findings and limitations

Finding Confidence Boundary
Mr. Evil profile and administrative account High A user account, not a biometric identity
Cain and Ethereal execution High Prefetch is host-level execution evidence
Remote share interaction Moderate to high No proven unauthorized access
PCAP contains captured HTTP exchange High Capture author and network vantage point unknown
Hotmail application confirmed send High Not proof of inbox delivery
Successful hacking or credential theft Not established No validated target-side compromise evidence

The available image does not include verified target-host telemetry, ISP/hotspot records, packet-capture chain of creation, or proof that the network session was obtained without permission. Event ID 592 was not found during the AXIOM review; Windows XP also does not normally retain complete command-line arguments in legacy process-creation events. The evidence therefore supports suspicious reconnaissance/interception-related activity but not a definitive allegation of successful compromise.

10. Final assessment

The strongest supported conclusion is that the examined laptop and Mr. Evil profile were associated with network exploration, use of sniffing-capable tools, and preservation of an HTTP packet capture containing a Hotmail email submission acknowledged by the service. No examined artifact independently establishes a successful unauthorized login, exploited vulnerability, or exfiltration from a third-party system. The case is accordingly assessed as corroborated security-tool and packet-capture activity, with unauthorized intrusion unproven.

Evidence references

The numbered figures reproduce screenshots from the examiner’s supplied evidence archive or screenshots shared during the investigation. Specific filenames and timestamps may be rechecked in the original Magnet AXIOM case. The separate interception capture was parsed and hash-verified as an exported working copy. No whole-image hash or tool-generated comprehensive export was supplied for this report.

All work

Index · Turki Adnan Abbas

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