Case 4

SwiftLogic: Android intellectual property theft

Tied a Gmail file request, nine downloaded project PDFs and a local temp ZIP together on a YAFFS2 Android image, and read two malicious APKs in JADX. Exfiltration not proven.

Tools
Cellebrite Inseyets PA · qnxprobe · DB Browser for SQLite · JADX · PowerShell
Category
Mobile · Android

Case TAA-MF-001: SwiftLogic intellectual property theft

Android mobile forensics. The forensic path runs from opening the case and examining the YAFFS2 file system, through Gmail messages, the download database, the PDF files and JADX, to browser history and the ASTRO files. The figures below are the steps of the investigation that carry or verify a finding, numbered in the order the work was done.

Item Value
Prepared by Turki Adnan Abbas · تركي عدنان عباس
Evidence EVD-001 · Yob Taog Android device · mtd8.dd (YAFFS2), mtd8_extracted.zip
Event window (UTC) 6–7 May 2011
Assessment File request and nine downloads: confirmed · Exfiltration: not proven

A necessary time separation. The messages and downloads are events of May 2011, in UTC. The order of the steps below is the order of the analyst’s work. Mixing the two is an inference error.

Executive summary

Bottom line. The phone holds a Gmail conversation in which project files were requested after the company server went down, and delivered on 7 May 2011 in two batches of three and six PDFs. The Android Download Manager recorded all nine as downloaded (status=200) between 16:51:53 and 17:12:33 UTC, and the same nine PDFs sit inside a local ZIP named temp, with one byte-identical match to a downloaded copy. Two installed APKs contain code that zips storage, opens a TCP socket to 50.56.29.109:10001, and sends and receives SMS. Nothing in the examined evidence shows that this code ran, or that the files left the device.

Question Answer Evidence
Were project files requested and sent by email? YES, confirmed Six File request messages, 6–7 May 2011; attachment batches of 3 and 6 PDFs (Figs 5, 13, 15, 16)
Were they downloaded to the phone? YES, confirmed Nine Download Manager rows, IDs 51 and 57–64, all status=200, tied to the two message IDs (Figs 19, 20)
Were they staged in an archive? YES, observed temp holds the nine PDFs; 2201-8.pdf is byte-identical to downloadfile-6.pdf. When the archive was made is not established (Figs 28, 34)
Is there code able to move them off the device? YES, static code only ZIP builder, socket to 50.56.29.109:10001, SMS send / receive (Figs 22–33)
Were the PDFs opened on the phone? Not shown Browser history holds only two Quickoffice help pages (Fig 36)
Was the data exfiltrated? NOT PROVEN No network record, no SMS receipt; the ASTRO WebView stores hold ads only (Figs 38–41)
Is the raw image integrity verified? Limited No hash for mtd8.dd; only the extracted package was hashed (Figs 2, 11)

Method and limits of inference

Separating the source of the evidence from what it proves.

  1. Inclusion. Only screenshots that carry or verify a finding are shown, numbered in the order of the work. Interface views, repeats and failed attempts are left out.
  2. Timing. Steps are ordered as they were performed. The analyst’s capture time is never attributed to 2011; the 2011 event sequence stands on its own further down.
  3. Copying and verification. Successful hashing and analysis copies are stated only where the screenshot supports them. Attempts with wrong paths do not count as a valid match. No hash is claimed for the raw image mtd8.dd, because none was supplied.
  4. Capability in code. Inference from JADX proves a code structure that may build a ZIP, open a socket or send SMS. It does not prove that it ran, or that data left the device.
  5. Bounded negatives. Zero ASTRO results for PDF or Quickoffice links is limited to the tables and filters examined. It does not rule out traces in other apps or in deleted files.

Case set-up and extraction review

Figures 1–4. The SwiftLogic case source was identified, and the YAFFS2 parse and its tree were examined before searching the content. A hash for the raw image mtd8.dd is not established by the available evidence.

Figure 1

Case SwiftLogic – Intellectual Property Theft opened in Physical Analyzer

Case SwiftLogic – Intellectual Property Theft opened in Physical Analyzer
File
01.png · 136.9 KB
SHA-256
66b41ed2862c58616ad1cdb571c77ed64120768bd3cd7d5b6026a4ca03a2b3c0

Figure 2

Evidence pack summary: Legacy extraction sources; no image hash available for any source

Evidence pack summary: Legacy extraction sources; no image hash available for any source
File
02.png · 61.7 KB
SHA-256
9995e4952024c8954112217496c6acd9d7e8986a5bd704a0c7563007280068b5

Figure 3

YAFFS2 layout recognised: 2048-byte pages with 64-byte OOB spare area

YAFFS2 layout recognised: 2048-byte pages with 64-byte OOB spare area
File
03.png · 28.5 KB
SHA-256
0887aa490b70e848541c3233393c08e8b738451a17237d2093e4679fcbf6d5bd

Figure 4

App data tree: com.andriod.mm listed; the name alone does not prove malicious activity

App data tree: com.andriod.mm listed; the name alone does not prove malicious activity
File
04.png · 9.2 KB
SHA-256
712ed6ad4500ff254f5f30dc56a5161b0d5020fdcbceb0fba72891c508392457

Gmail correspondence

Figures 5–7. The mail store, the File request subject, the message text and the attachments were explored. Exact chronology was left to the SQLite queries.

Figure 5

Nine project PDF attachment names in two attachment groups

Nine project PDF attachment names in two attachment groups
File
05.png · 115.4 KB
SHA-256
dd33f41883d902975230baeefbcc23e7adb55944ac1c1a250d5e2fabe58d8e9b

Figure 6

Reply: no files were attached, asks to get them that night; context, not a download

Reply: no files were attached, asks to get them that night; context, not a download
File
06.png · 128.0 KB
SHA-256
b57c90c2b0fdc8b30b3fe73c77b74de7ab92532ce77dea984cd931526a521b68

Figure 7

Request for project 2228 files: company server down, access needed by phone

Request for project 2228 files: company server down, access needed by phone
File
07.png · 131.9 KB
SHA-256
cdca101b00089ac473853698030a903c1d8386710f365d488e17d0702d1a321d

Project files

Figures 8–9. The engineering PDF files were found, some were reviewed, and SHA-256 was compared for one specific pair. The ewfprobe.py attempt did not succeed.

Figure 8

Engineering PDF page marked DRAFT: shows the content, not that it was leaked

Engineering PDF page marked DRAFT: shows the content, not that it was leaked
File
08.png · 205.1 KB
SHA-256
f5ce10e65975fda53d0ad439bc8e69b875c086c5b6108456d9905957888f3edc

Figure 9

The nine PDF names recovered from storage, matching the Gmail list

The nine PDF names recovered from storage, matching the Gmail list
File
09.png · 150.9 KB
SHA-256
1fbf288c1a1bde7dd77e4d4783475f96069e27a13badfb0917e8bdbbfe5a825c

Completing the evidence and analysis copies

Figures 10–12. The examination resumed: the temp file was identified and hashed working copies were started. The mtd8.dd path failed first; the hash then taken is of the extracted archive, not the raw original.

Figure 10

The archive named temp, later shown to hold the nine PDFs

The archive named temp, later shown to hold the nine PDFs
File
10.png · 179.5 KB
SHA-256
4cf7617365ad55c3b1cece6703fed046771ba2a415e54672412d7895320e1903

Figure 11

SHA-256 of mtd8_extracted.zip: the extracted package, not the raw mtd8.dd

SHA-256 of mtd8_extracted.zip: the extracted package, not the raw mtd8.dd
File
11.png · 19.5 KB
SHA-256
95c40d5a3fb4a09de56335e21ef525e29d4b22833547ed83bb887b08f058412e

Figure 12

Copy-Item to mailstore_analysis.db and the working copy's hash

Copy-Item to mailstore_analysis.db and the working copy's hash
File
12.png · 25.3 KB
SHA-256
e6392f8e79dd6e8bec09a05fe25db38e6f348b20733f16d6746b444be84e396f

Gmail through SQLite

Figures 13–16. Six File request messages were queried in UTC, and the two attachment groups (3, then 6) and the two message IDs were established.

Figure 13

File request query in UTC: six messages, 6–7 May 2011, request to the 9-file reply

File request query in UTC: six messages, 6–7 May 2011, request to the 9-file reply
File
13.png · 77.2 KB
SHA-256
5630e28ef40d0cca581f70a8c4e6640a76d403983204fb9cfdc0323b9e03b163

Figure 14

Attachments joined to Gmail messages: PDF names with message and date fields

Attachments joined to Gmail messages: PDF names with message and date fields
File
14.png · 74.2 KB
SHA-256
4324a2819281392a2e9d2e6cb4d4da6fd51830a265c1ddaad4a1da318e0b98bd

Figure 15

First attachment group: three PDFs from project 2228

First attachment group: three PDFs from project 2228
File
15.png · 65.0 KB
SHA-256
6d5104cd3c5f16e810a205b248ace162f5e99d14eb977d47fb79414bdc77c09d

Figure 16

Second attachment group: six more PDFs from projects 2201 and 2228

Second attachment group: six more PDFs from projects 2201 and 2228
File
16.png · 71.0 KB
SHA-256
c5d7e65b4ec940b2aee6c1c4d5ac42470880c96c29e48661bd606decd514e6fd

Download Manager

Figures 17–20. downloads.db was examined on a corrected analysis copy; nine successful entries (status=200) were tied to the Gmail message IDs and to cache paths.

Figure 17

SHA-256 of downloads.db before the analysis copy

SHA-256 of downloads.db before the analysis copy
File
17.png · 30.2 KB
SHA-256
fb4577eabd0cd6a2113850c165eae2ada1f444d04c4fdba8fb315534a9db865a

Figure 18

downloads.db copied to downloads_analysis.db and hashes compared

downloads.db copied to downloads_analysis.db and hashes compared
File
18.png · 24.1 KB
SHA-256
d9155bbef685ebe11c34220fffea91f07eb28a248e46e88bd0194173fff10546

Figure 19

Nine downloads: IDs 51 and 57–64, lastmod, status=200 and sizes

Nine downloads: IDs 51 and 57–64, lastmod, status=200 and sizes
File
19.png · 84.8 KB
SHA-256
3968bf923ec66d7cc948b81243cba2bd8a24227f758c25816cb7c2f8e11904bb

Figure 20

Downloads tied to the two messages: 3 then 6, all nine status=200

Downloads tied to the two messages: 3 then 6, all nine status=200
File
20.png · 81.4 KB
SHA-256
6505e9947928174d2d5683c5f9ca2c0fa66594f82b7faec31ef428013a089a45

Static analysis of the main app

Figures 21–28. com.andriod.mm.apk was decompiled in JADX and its permissions, its service path (ZIP / socket) and its broadcast to an SMS helper were documented. These are code capabilities, not proof of execution.

Figure 21

SHA-256 of the main APK com.andriod.mm.apk

SHA-256 of the main APK com.andriod.mm.apk
File
21.png · 32.8 KB
SHA-256
e47fe90a3fa2d43940ff388aaacfcaa40ba02fdee568fd3f02da2cebab0800dc

Figure 22

Manifest: INTERNET, READ_PHONE_STATE and a BOOT_COMPLETED receiver; capability, not execution

Manifest: INTERNET, READ_PHONE_STATE and a BOOT_COMPLETED receiver; capability, not execution
File
22.png · 133.8 KB
SHA-256
7e4dba251dd8db4dc0e0c82cdba4892444fea9c1100c25c55e272218d1a14dce

Figure 23

Boot receiver starts a service on boot; mechanism shown, activation not proven

Boot receiver starts a service on boot; mechanism shown, activation not proven
File
23.png · 131.4 KB
SHA-256
0c4b9792614d02ff56fd380b6e062a6a005259e483726724207879b81183d1b7

Figure 24

mediaMounter constants: 50.56.29.109, TCP port 10001 and the name temp

mediaMounter constants: 50.56.29.109, TCP port 10001 and the name temp
File
24.png · 133.7 KB
SHA-256
312cd90e49f2499ba4869615fe6165d3633599a7cac87f42f93c75b39d90aa59

Figure 25

doStuff: walks sdcard files, builds a ZIP, calls a send method (static code)

doStuff: walks sdcard files, builds a ZIP, calls a send method (static code)
File
25.png · 131.3 KB
SHA-256
ee5035b5443c76e2058021c77f5541d27478d488ce6234fa9ddeb90bdd822953

Figure 26

Broadcast with action com.vzw.smsProvider.ACTION_SEND to another package

Broadcast with action com.vzw.smsProvider.ACTION_SEND to another package
File
26.png · 17.2 KB
SHA-256
75183356337e863ee3df721ba777047bf23a9bebdf1002ffe7751f1386cc3a53

Figure 27

sendFile: socket and stream write with flush; capability does not confirm sending

sendFile: socket and stream write with flush; capability does not confirm sending
File
27.png · 123.2 KB
SHA-256
e661c351af292dde63ce98c1dffd50cbdbd282cd5dffe0e3f933e67b2ca67360

Figure 28

The nine names in temp and the SHA-256 of the whole ZIP

The nine names in temp and the SHA-256 of the whole ZIP
File
28.png · 37.9 KB
SHA-256
82c7021258e2ebcf2ed517f91ef9ecbc39339a4b9427e7125ea9934a9d29153c

The SMS helper app, and comparison

Figures 29–34. com.vzw.smsProvider.apk, its permissions and its SMS receive / send routines were examined. One PDF was compared by SHA-256 between the ZIP and the cache copy.

Figure 29

SHA-256 of com.vzw.smsProvider.apk

SHA-256 of com.vzw.smsProvider.apk
File
29.png · 29.7 KB
SHA-256
a926c3cdff6c292dbe06027381edbc18345e91e9db34e2ab793db4e47fef3a9f

Figure 30

Manifest: SEND_SMS and RECEIVE_SMS with receivers; no sent message proven

Manifest: SEND_SMS and RECEIVE_SMS with receivers; no sent message proven
File
30.png · 99.4 KB
SHA-256
7647edec0ba8d307b8612be6b17b731b370d4307b734166e6b421d2a464c8623

Figure 31

sendSMSRec receives the ACTION_SEND intent and prepares an SMS text

sendSMSRec receives the ACTION_SEND intent and prepares an SMS text
File
31.png · 96.3 KB
SHA-256
215fbc1b6d9e80e16462bb6ba073d10408ad9368084668ef42a855ea00caf015

Figure 32

smsLib / SmsManager.sendTextMessage: a send-to-number routine exists; no SMS proven sent

smsLib / SmsManager.sendTextMessage: a send-to-number routine exists; no SMS proven sent
File
32.png · 113.1 KB
SHA-256
a20d23b55662cc2ea7db0385851abcaa7bbf8678995ac3edca0bb0f9f81a1654

Figure 33

SMSRec reads incoming pdus: sender, time and text, passed to a helper

SMSRec reads incoming pdus: sender, time and text, passed to a helper
File
33.png · 142.4 KB
SHA-256
2e00c05a5b3ffe6cf4e13a430f716d96858cffed6c7e37c54f9d406f99234b69

Figure 34

2201-8.pdf extracted from temp: hash matches downloadfile-6.pdf

2201-8.pdf extracted from temp: hash matches downloadfile-6.pdf
File
34.png · 51.2 KB
SHA-256
7743cbaf807fc6c8cbc8bba5f1daa73b11a2d2dc99527128f2d956f6a8704ee1

Figures 35–36. browser.db shows two Quickoffice support pages visited after the first download, with no direct evidence of a PDF being opened.

Figure 35

browser.db hashed and copied to browser_analysis.db

browser.db hashed and copied to browser_analysis.db
File
35.png · 40.9 KB
SHA-256
b9a89ac00f2f50765d1b391ffd8cd0f9a37f144e05f615ce8e52be7b80496703

Figure 36

Two Quickoffice help-page visits, 7 May 2011 16:52:08 and 16:52:18 UTC; no PDF opened

Two Quickoffice help-page visits, 7 May 2011 16:52:08 and 16:52:18 UTC; no PDF opened
File
36.png · 70.5 KB
SHA-256
f20cd9072938a254eb1447b413ec043dbe74f1a0f6636c967e5da1a8efdaf930

ASTRO and the WebView databases

Figures 37–41. webviewCache.db and webview.db were reviewed. The negative results concern these tables only and do not clear every trace of use.

Figure 37

ASTRO databases copied to analysis; hashes equal

ASTRO databases copied to analysis; hashes equal
File
37.png · 92.4 KB
SHA-256
c51e7ce5937dbb09776005859419f2db5db70a5f411b90720180c646872e57fe

Figure 38

Negative result: 25 rows, 23 DoubleClick, 0 PDF or Quickoffice matches

Negative result: 25 rows, 23 DoubleClick, 0 PDF or Quickoffice matches
File
38.png · 69.5 KB
SHA-256
53518847f429800eec53d514239013d1491e10b4954834b81a29afe8f5fb6da7

Figure 39

Negative result: the two non-DoubleClick rows are a JavaScript file and a PNG

Negative result: the two non-DoubleClick rows are a JavaScript file and a PNG
File
39.png · 68.2 KB
SHA-256
a38b62aaed586677f4dd4862ca549e4810dbaf81d090ac2d05658cd5a810e2c3

Figure 40

Negative result: one cookie; formdata, formurl, httpauth and password empty

Negative result: one cookie; formdata, formurl, httpauth and password empty
File
40.png · 71.7 KB
SHA-256
05498ca0ce40cf9b36fc0bc37cc883409e066feabca57477a46312609e2a71f7

Figure 41

Negative result: the cookie is id for DoubleClick, length 49, secure=0; not a login

Negative result: the cookie is id for DoubleClick, length 49, secure=0; not a login
File
41.png · 68.0 KB
SHA-256
20bc1767e4bf59a68dd408d71e67ae0aa69aa63b38637a27db3d39a94b251865

shared_prefs review and source sign-off

Figures 42–45. Five XML files were examined, their copies verified and their paths matched against Cellebrite. The values are static preferences, with no record of sending.

Figure 42

XML copied to analysis/shared_prefs and hashes compared

XML copied to analysis/shared_prefs and hashes compared
File
42.png · 117.8 KB
SHA-256
ee199c0691d3dc74373444878a6c3df49cb5c05fc073a268af475d30dbc1cea1

Figure 43

astro_preferences: backup_dir=/sdcard/backups, current_path DCIM/Camera; settings, not transfers

astro_preferences: backup_dir=/sdcard/backups, current_path DCIM/Camera; settings, not transfers
File
43.png · 32.5 KB
SHA-256
9f31f210b92389afec0779884d8f41326672c0bd9fb8836e21e9ba82a5baea74

Figure 44

webview.db and webviewCache.db at data/com.metago.astro/databases/ in the extraction

webview.db and webviewCache.db at data/com.metago.astro/databases/ in the extraction
File
44.png · 99.9 KB
SHA-256
a4d7b7de69ebb8fba0ebc1db107b8f54f20e39d84193e8252d53fca9d0893e75

Figure 45

The five shared_prefs files at data/com.metago.astro/shared_prefs/ in the extraction

The five shared_prefs files at data/com.metago.astro/shared_prefs/ in the extraction
File
45.png · 108.0 KB
SHA-256
ed4492fc9f1d6867dcdaf9e60904a46d882ffe17b36130c894eb49a1b489584d

2011 event chronology (UTC)

Events that can be verified from the mail and the downloads. These dates come from the 2011 evidence, not from when the screenshots were taken. The strength of each point depends on its source, not on where its screenshot falls in the session.

UTC, 2011 Event Supporting steps
6 May 19:35:05 Request for the project files after the server failure; use from the phone is mentioned Figs 7, 13
7 May 00:14:25 Reply from SwiftLogic in the File request conversation Fig 13
7 May 00:23:20 Reply saying the files are not attached and asking for them Figs 6, 13
7 May 03:11:04 SwiftLogic message with the first group: three PDF files Figs 5, 13, 15
7 May 04:29:18 A further reply in the conversation before the second batch Fig 13
7 May 16:40:49 SwiftLogic message with the second group: six PDF files Figs 5, 13, 16
7 May 16:51:53 First relevant Download Manager row: ID 51, status=200 Figs 19, 20
7 May 16:52:08–16:52:18 Two visits to Quickoffice help pages; they do not prove the project files were opened Fig 36
7 May 17:08:06–17:12:33 The next eight downloads, IDs 57 to 64, all status=200 Figs 19–20
Not precisely dated The local temp file holding the nine PDFs; when the archive was created is not established here Figs 10, 28
Not precisely dated The static code shows ZIP, socket and SMS functions; no connection logs or send receipts Figs 22–33

Downloads tied to attachments

Project file names from Gmail / the ZIP were tied to cache locations through the part order and the messageId. The nine rows below all have status=200. The times are lastmod as recorded in the Android database, not the time a file was opened.

ID lastmod (UTC) Size cache file ↔ project file Message group
51 07/05/2011 16:51:53 260,786 bytes downloadfile-1.pdf ↔ 2228-11.pdf First
57 07/05/2011 17:08:06 48,113 bytes downloadfile-2.pdf ↔ 2228-12.pdf First
58 07/05/2011 17:10:31 47,157 bytes downloadfile-3.pdf ↔ 2228-15.pdf First
59 07/05/2011 17:11:12 29,541 bytes downloadfile-4.pdf ↔ 2201-4.pdf Second
60 07/05/2011 17:11:30 42,881 bytes downloadfile-5.pdf ↔ 2201-7.pdf Second
61 07/05/2011 17:11:44 52,359 bytes downloadfile-6.pdf ↔ 2201-8.pdf Second
62 07/05/2011 17:12:02 46,343 bytes downloadfile-7.pdf ↔ 2201-9.pdf Second
63 07/05/2011 17:12:21 177,047 bytes downloadfile-8.pdf ↔ 2228-7.pdf Second
64 07/05/2011 17:12:33 136,844 bytes downloadfile-9.pdf ↔ 2228-10.pdf Second

The byte-for-byte SHA-256 match confirmed in this evidence is for the pair downloadfile-6.pdf and 2201-8.pdf only, not for all nine files together (Fig 34).

Established findings and limits

Confirmed, code capability, and not proven, kept apart.

Status Finding Source
Confirmed Correspondence requesting project files over Gmail: six dated messages and two attachment batches, 3 + 6 Figs 5–7, 13–16
Confirmed Nine Download Manager rows with status=200, Gmail references and matching messages Figs 19–20
Confirmed Nine PDF names inside temp, and one SHA-256 match between a ZIP file and its cache copy Figs 28, 34
Static capability The first APK reads storage and builds a ZIP and a TCP socket; the second sends and receives SMS Figs 22–33
Confirmed, bounded Quickoffice: two help pages only. WebViewCache: 25 entries, 23 DoubleClick ads, 0 PDF / Quickoffice Figs 36, 38
Not proven No independent network record shows the ZIP sent to 50.56.29.109:10001; no SMS proven sent, and no data proven received by the other party Static review, Figs 24–33
Not proven No evidence that the nine PDFs were opened in Quickoffice, and none that they were uploaded through ASTRO Figs 36–41
Integrity limit No hash of the original mtd8.dd in the screenshots, and the raw file is not here. The ewfprobe.py check and the attempt to hash mtd8.dd failed Figs 2, 11

Figure index

The figures follow the order of the work, not the chronological order of the May 2011 events.

Case: TAA-MF-001 / SwiftLogic Intellectual Property Theft. Source: supplied case screenshots, SQLite databases including downloads.db, and sampled files. No evidence of actual network exfiltration is asserted.

All work

Index · Turki Adnan Abbas

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