Case 3

Windows host compromise: service persistence and suspected data staging

Reconstructed an RDP logon, a malicious coreupdater.exe service and access to loot.zip from a Windows E01 using FTK Imager and Zimmerman tools. Compromise confirmed; exfiltration not proven.

Tools
FTK Imager · Registry Explorer · EvtxECmd · MFTECmd · PECmd · SrumECmd · Timeline Explorer · ESEDatabaseView · VirusTotal · PowerShell
Category
Computer · Windows

Case CASE-011: Windows host compromise and suspected data staging

DFIR evidence report · version 1.4 · acquisition-to-analysis evidence. A defensible, artifact-led reconstruction of privileged access, service persistence, document activity, and network usage.

Item Value
Prepared by Turki Adnan Abbas · تركي عدنان عباس
Examined host DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.C137.local
Primary window (UTC) 19 Sep 2020 03:36–05:14
Assessment Compromise: high confidence · Exfiltration: unconfirmed

Case-study report, revised to show the artifact extraction and analysis folder inventories (Figs 03–04). Findings are derived from an acquired Windows E01 image, offline event/registry artifacts, parsed artifact exports and analyst-provided screenshots. Case claims are separated from leads and data gaps. The specific E01 acquisition hash was not supplied and is not asserted here; a locally computed ZIP package fingerprint is separately documented in Fig 02.

Authoritative evidence hierarchy. Host-generated artifacts → cross-parser corroboration → third-party reputation intelligence. Transparent yellow marker strokes identify observed values in enlarged screenshot crops while retaining the original lettering and numbers. Original source captures remain unchanged; source paths accompany every plate.

01. Executive assessment

Bottom line. The examined workstation experienced privileged interactive access followed within minutes by placement, execution, and installation of a highly suspicious executable as an auto-start Windows service. Two independent host artifacts subsequently attribute network usage to that executable. Separately, the Administrator profile records access to another user’s private documents and a shortcut to an archive named loot.zip. The evidence supports compromise and plausible data staging; it does not prove the archive was transmitted off-host.

Question Answer Rationale / evidence
Was a privileged session observed? YES — observed RDP-style Event 4624, LogonType 10, C137\Administrator, 03:36:24 UTC (Fig 11).
Did coreupdater.exe execute? YES — high confidence MFT placement; Prefetch RunCount=1 at 03:40:49; Amcache hash linkage (Figs 13–15 and 20).
Was persistence established? YES — confirmed Auto-start service registry entry and System 7045 installation at 03:42:42 (Figs 16–18).
Was a suspicious archive referenced? YES — observed WebCache URL and Administrator Recent\loot.lnk refer to Morty user’s loot.zip (Figs 23–25).
Did malware use the network? YES — application attributed Two SRUM records, 248,616 sent bytes across recorded buckets (Figs 27–28).
Was data exfiltration proven? NO — unresolved No recovered archive, destination-specific traffic, packet evidence, proxy logs, or clear file-transfer audit.

Confidence designations. CONFIRMED = directly recorded by native host artifacts, usually with corroboration. SUPPORTED = multiple related but indirect observations. POSSIBLE = inference requiring additional telemetry. UNCONFIRMED = insufficient proof to assert the event occurred.

Time basis: parsed artifact timestamps are reported in UTC where the parser indicates UTC. The offline SYSTEM registry names Pacific Standard Time with ActiveTimeBias=420 minutes (Fig 07), so local display and parser time should not be conflated. SRUM timestamps are periodic usage buckets, not exact per-packet connection times.

02. Case scope and method

Examined evidence: forensic image 20200918_0417_DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.E01 (Fig 01), the collected artifact inventory (Fig 03: $MFT.copy0, $LogFile.copy0, $UsnJrnl.copy0, Amcache.hve, SAM, SOFTWARE, SYSTEM, Logs, Prefetch, SRUM and other folders), and the eight artifact-specific processing folders (Fig 04). The analysis used exported $MFT, registry hives, Security/System EVTX, Prefetch, Amcache, Windows WebCache ESE database, SRUDB.dat, Windows Recent Items, and screenshot/CSV review records. A PowerShell screenshot records local hash calculations of DESKTOP-E01.zip (Fig 02); these are not E01 hashes and no matching acquisition manifest was provided. The screenshots establish a working inventory but do not prove extraction completeness, origin of every listed file or verified bitstream integrity.

Acquisition-to-analysis trace: Fig 01 documents the mounted E01; Fig 02 the local ZIP fingerprint; Fig 03 the copied forensic artifact working set; and Fig 04 the organized parser-output folders. The two File Explorer views do not expose address bars, so parent working-directory paths in their captions are corroborated or reconstructed from the separately captured Security.evtx parser command, not represented as independently screenshot-verified addresses.

Workflow: (1) identify OS/host; (2) normalize native logs into CSV; (3) isolate RDP session and privilege events; (4) pivot on executable file and service; (5) validate execution with Prefetch/Amcache; (6) inspect local-file browser history and shortcuts; (7) examine SRUM; (8) attempt deletion/network corroboration; (9) constrain conclusions to the available proof.

03. Reconstructed timeline (UTC)

UTC Observation Source Evidence status
19 Sep 03:36:24 C137\Administrator RemoteInteractive / LogonType 10, source 10.42.85.10 Security 4624 / Fig 11 Observed; IP ownership unresolved
03:39:58 Account/local group enumeration; same session LogonId Security 4798 / Fig 12 Observed; intent not established
03:40:00 coreupdater.exe created in C:\Windows\System32, 7,168 bytes $MFT / Fig 13 Observed
03:40:49 coreupdater.exe Prefetch last execution; RunCount=1 PECmd / Fig 14 Observed execution
03:40:59 Prefetch file creation $MFT / Fig 15 Corroborated
03:42:42 Auto-start service coreupdater installed; LocalSystem System 7045 + Registry / Figs 16–18 Confirmed persistence
03:45:34–03:47:39 Local file history for Morty documents including loot.zip WebCache + Recent LNK / Figs 23–25 Observed references; content unresolved
04:14 bucket coreupdater.exe — 222,046 sent, 333,817 received SRUM / Fig 27 Observed aggregate usage
05:14 bucket coreupdater.exe — 26,570 sent, 170,146 received SRUM / Fig 28 Observed aggregate usage

The ordered activities are consistent with the sequence access → payload placement → execution → persistence → local-document interaction → ongoing network use. The timeline alone cannot prove a single human operator or a file-specific outbound transfer.

04. Technical findings

F-01: Interactive access and privileged activity

Security.evtx Record 2125 contains Event 4624 for C137\Administrator at 03:36:24 UTC with LogonType 10 and source address 10.42.85.10. The private source address could represent a DC, relay, jump host or other internal asset; owner and exposure require corroboration. Record 2304 (Event 4798) at 03:39:58 shares the relevant logon context, but its process name PickerHost.exe makes malicious intent a qualified hypothesis rather than a standalone fact. The SAM hive lists a separate local Administrator account (Fig 09), so the domain-scoped logon identity must not be equated to SAM presence. See Figs 09–12.

F-02: Malware execution and persistence

MFT Entry 26213 records a 7,168-byte coreupdater.exe under System32 with creation timestamp 03:40:00 UTC. Prefetch COREUPDATER.EXE-157C54BB.pf independently records one execution at 03:40:49 and was created by 03:40:59. The SYSTEM registry defines a service with the executable path, Automatic startup, and a LastWrite of 03:42:42. System.evtx Event 7045 records service installation at the same time under LocalSystem; the parsed compact service row is reproduced separately for field-level readability (Fig 18). These observations establish a host-resident executable and service persistence; no inference from file-name similarity alone is required. See Figs 13–18.

Sample reputation reports 64/71 detections. The Amcache SHA1 entry matches the submitted sample’s SHA1. The sandbox IP 203.78.103.109 is a candidate external IOC from isolated sandbox execution, not an observed endpoint connection. A local analyst VM Defender warning seen elsewhere during extracted-sample review must not be attributed to the historical target image. See Figs 19–21.

F-03: Sensitive document references and possible staging

Administrator WebCache Container_8 holds local file-history references to the Morty user’s documents. Matching Recent Items shortcuts corroborate user-interface interaction. The shortcut loot.lnk embeds C:\Users\mortysmith\Documents\loot.zip as its target and advertises target size 131,041 bytes. This is compelling evidence that an archive path was referenced, but neither its byte contents nor its actual creation via an MFT entry was recovered. We therefore classify archive staging as plausible/supported, not as independently verified bulk collection. See Figs 22–25.

F-04: Post-installation network usage

SrumECmd parsed SRUDB.dat and the offline SOFTWARE hive to resolve AppId 433 to coreupdater.exe and UserId 428 to Administrator. ID 190 (04:14 bucket) reports 222,046 sent and 333,817 received; ID 193 (05:14 bucket) reports 26,570 sent and 170,146 received. Across these two records, 248,616 bytes were sent and 503,963 bytes received. SRUM does not provide destination IP, remote service, packet payload or identification of which files contributed to the bytes. This is communication/usage evidence, not file-exfil proof. See Figs 26–28.

F-05: Recovery and telemetry gaps

No loot.zip file was located in the exported MFT search and it did not appear in the inspected Recycle Bin directories. The inspected Firewall directory lacked pfirewall.log; Sysmon operational EVTX and file/network audit evidence were not available; the $UsnJrnl::$J recovery attempt was incomplete even though FTK showed alternate streams. The export inventory also shows $UsnJrnl.copy0 as 0 KB (Fig 03). These are limits of the examined sources, not proof that deletion or outbound transmission did not occur. See Figs 29–31.

05. Indicator register and controlled interpretations

Artifact / indicator Value Origin and use
Host / domain DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.C137.local Host scoping; offline registry and event record
Service / image coreupdater → C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe Confirmed persistence; hunt equivalent service keys / image paths
SHA256 (malware sample) 10f3b92002bb98467334161cf85d0b1730851f9256f83c27db125e9a0c1cfda6 Reputation sample; verify same file with independent image-extracted hash if available
SHA1 (Amcache + sample) fd153c66386ca93ec9993d66a84d6f0d129a3a5c Confirmed hash agreement between sample and Amcache
MD5 (sample) eed41b4500e473f97c50c7385ef5e374 Sample identity; not evidence of source host network
Source address (RDP) 10.42.85.10 Private network source; investigate DHCP/DC/VPN ownership
Candidate network IOC 203.78.103.109 VirusTotal sandbox ONLY; no observed victim connection
Archive target C:\Users\mortysmith\Documents\loot.zip WebCache and LNK referral; source archive not recovered

06. MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Technique Status Evidence / caveat
T1021.001 — Remote Desktop Protocol Observed behavior Security 4624 LogonType 10; specific access origin/control unresolved.
T1078 — Valid Accounts Consistent / not attribution Successful domain Administrator interactive session. Does not prove credential theft.
T1543.003 — Windows Service Confirmed coreupdater auto-start service; registry + System 7045.
T1005 — Data from Local System Possible History/LNK refer to another profile’s documents; actual contents not recovered.
T1560.001 — Archive via Utility Hypothesis only loot.zip shortcut; archive creation tool / command line not identified.
T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel NOT ESTABLISHED SRUM outbound bytes without destination, content or proof of archive transfer.

07. Toolchain and investigation traceability

The following inventory distinguishes tools visibly operated in the analyst workflow from outputs/parsers referenced by the supplied artifacts. Figures 03–04 show the collected source-file and analysis-folder inventories. Figure 10 preserves the actual EvtxECmd console syntax; any additional search/filter examples are illustrative and are not represented as historical console commands.

Tool Input / search pivot Output / investigation purpose
FTK Imager 4.5.0.3 20200918_0417_DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.E01; file-system tree Browse/export artifacts, inspect LNK bytes, Recycle Bin, SRUM and logging paths.
PowerShell Get-FileHash C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\DESKTOP-E01.zip SHA-256 and MD5 locally computed for ZIP evidence package (Fig 02); no E01 hash verification.
Registry Explorer SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, Amcache.hve OS build/identity, ProfileList, services\coreupdater and LastWrite.
EvtxECmd Security.evtx and System.evtx Security_Analysis.csv, Event 4624/4798, System Event 7045.
MFTECmd C:\$MFT MFT_Analysis.csv — executable and Prefetch file timestamps, filename searches.
PECmd C:\Windows\Prefetch\*.pf [run time]_PECmd_Output.csv — run count, executable path, LastRun.
AmcacheParser C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve [run time]_Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv — SHA1 and file inventory.
AppCompatCacheParser SYSTEM / AppCompatCache [run time]_Windows10C_11_SYSTEM_AppCompatCache.csv; no positive coreupdater match.
ESEDatabaseView Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat Containers → Container_8 / History; WebCache_Container8.txt export.
SrumECmd C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat + SOFTWARE [run time]_SrumECmd_NetworkUsages_Output.csv — IDs 190, 193.
Timeline Explorer v2026.10.0 Parsed CSVs Date, user, path, and executable pivots with record-level field inspection.
VirusTotal coreupdater sample hash / submitted sample Sample reputation, MD5/SHA1/SHA256 and sandbox indicators; sandbox provenance kept separate.
Windows File Explorer CASE-011\Artifacts and CASE-011\Analysis folder inventories (Figs 03–04) Document the visible file copies, sizes, eight processing folders and supplementary logging checks. The images do not themselves identify the extraction utility.
Shell Link static review loot.lnk + other supplied .lnk files Read embedded target path and target-file metadata; no shortcut execution by the analyst.

08. Reproducible paths and analyst search pivots

Host-side evidence locations: exact relative path in image.

Pivot Host artifact / filter
Registry: OS identity C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE → Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
Registry: profiles HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList
Registry: local time C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM → ControlSet001\Control\TimeZoneInformation
Registry: local users C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM → SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names
Registry: service C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM → ControlSet001\Services\coreupdater
Host authentication C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Security.evtx; EventId IN (4624,4798)
Service-install event C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx; EventId = 7045
Suspect executable C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe
Execution proof C:\Windows\Prefetch\COREUPDATER.EXE-157C54BB.pf
File-system timeline C:\$MFT; FileName CONTAINS ‘coreupdater’ or ‘loot.zip’
Amcache SHA1 C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve
Administrator WebCache C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat → Container_8
Recent Items C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.lnk
Archive target referenced C:\Users\mortysmith\Documents\loot.zip
Network attribution C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat; ExeInfo CONTAINS ‘coreupdater.exe’
Deletion review C:\$Recycle.Bin\; C:\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J; C:\$LogFile
Firewall text log C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log [not found]
Sysmon operational C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx [not found]

Analyst-side extraction/export paths shown by source screenshots.

C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Artifacts\ — observed working-set names: Logs\, NTFS\, PerfLogs\, Prefetch\, SchCache\, SRUM\, $LogFile.copy0, $MFT.copy0, $UsnJrnl.copy0, Amcache.hve, SAM, SOFTWARE, SYSTEM (Fig 03). Exact File Explorer address bar not pictured; parent inferred from separately captured parser source path.

C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Analysis\ — observed processing folders: Amcache\, MFT\, Prefetch\, Security\, Shimcache\, SRUM\, System\, WebCache\ (Fig 04). Parent path inferred from separately captured parser output directory.

C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Artifacts\Logs\Security.evtx → C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Analysis\Security\Security_Analysis.csv

C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Artifacts\$MFT.copy0 → MFT_Analysis.csv; CASE-011\Analysis\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat → WebCache_Container8.txt

CASE-011\Analysis\SRUM\[run time]_SrumECmd_NetworkUsages_Output.csv; CASE-011\Analysis\Prefetch\[run time]_PECmd_Output.csv (report-relative reconstructed from supplied export names; do not treat this portion as a forensic original file path unless validated against the workstation).

Recorded parser command and package hash checks: captured console source.

EvtxECmd: .\EvtxECmd.exe -f "C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Artifacts\Logs\Security.evtx" --csv "C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Analysis\Security" --csvf Security_Analysis.csv (Fig 10; transcribed from the visible console).

PowerShell: Get-FileHash -LiteralPath ".\DESKTOP-E01.zip" -Algorithm SHA256; Get-FileHash ".\DESKTOP-E01.zip" -Algorithm MD5 (Fig 02). The calculated hashes pertain to the ZIP container, not the mounted E01 image.

Example reproducible filters: ExeInfo CONTAINS 'coreupdater.exe'; EventId=4624 AND PayloadData2 CONTAINS 'LogonType 10'; EventId=7045; FileName CONTAINS 'loot.zip'; URL CONTAINS '/Users/mortysmith/Documents/'; [Created0x10] >= #2020-09-19# AND [Created0x10] < #2020-09-20#. These are search expressions/intent, not verbatim archived console commands.

Priority Evidence needed How it answers the question
P0 Perimeter/proxy/DNS/EDR/netflow logs, 03:35–06:00 UTC Resolve actual coreupdater destinations and whether outbound traffic reached an external receiver.
P0 EDR process lineage, PowerShell, command-line/4688, service installer telemetry Identify original executable delivery, operator command line, process ancestry and possible archive creation command.
P1 Recover $UsnJrnl:$J, $LogFile, volume shadow copies, unallocated sectors Test archive create/rename/delete activity and recover loot.zip or remnants.
P1 Source file metadata/content and Office/MRU/cloud sync logs Clarify whether all documents were opened, bundled, uploaded or merely referenced.
P1 Identity and VPN/DC/DHCP correlation for 10.42.85.10 Attribute remote session source and determine whether credentials were abused.
P2 Imaging/acquisition manifest and cryptographic image verification Document chain of custody and prove byte-for-byte acquisition integrity.

10. Containment and detection actions

  • Preserve the full forensic image, relevant volatile/EDR records, original hashes and analyst timeline before containment actions change the endpoint.
  • Isolate the affected host from untrusted networks while permitting approved forensic collection; review any adjacent hosts reached by the privileged account.
  • Disable/eradicate coreupdater service and quarantine binary only after evidence preservation; validate remediation with file, registry and Autoruns/EDR rescans.
  • Investigate C137\Administrator credential use, session origin and potential privileged credential exposure; rotate/revoke as incident response requires.
  • Threat-hunt exact SHA1/SHA256, service name/path, Prefetch basename and unusual creation of services in System32 across the environment.
  • Enrich audit coverage: System 7045, Security 4624/4798, full 4688 command lines, Sysmon ProcessCreate/FileCreate/NetworkConnect where appropriate, DNS/proxy/EDR and firewall text logging.
  • Escalate possible sensitive-data impact to the data owner, with an explicit distinction between suspected staging and unverified off-host disclosure.

11. Conclusion and evidentiary disposition

The host-compromise finding is high confidence: a privileged remote session closely precedes installation and execution of a malware-reputed executable that persisted as an Automatic LocalSystem service. The on-disk MFT record, Prefetch run, service registry configuration, System 7045 record and Amcache/sample identity support a mutually reinforcing account. A separate trail documents access/reference to sensitive documents under another user profile and a target archive loot.zip; SRUM attributes later aggregate network bytes to the suspect process. The chain does not connect the archive’s bytes to any destination. The strongest responsible finding is CONFIRMED MALWARE EXECUTION AND SERVICE PERSISTENCE; POSSIBLE DATA STAGING AND POTENTIAL DATA EXPOSURE; EXFILTRATION NOT CONFIRMED.

Evidence notes: the analyst supplied artifacts and images as an investigative working set; no verified original CASE-011 image hash, immutable evidence inventory or external corroboration logs were included. Screenshots in the following plates are used as provenance illustrations and are supported, where possible, by matching CSV outputs.

12. Evidence plate index

Plates 01–16 Plates 17–31
Fig 01: Original E01 evidence mounted in FTK Fig 17: Service installation event
Fig 02: Locally computed evidence ZIP hashes Fig 18: Service creation CSV cross-check
Fig 03: Extracted forensic artifact inventory Fig 19: Malware reputation finding
Fig 04: Parsed-artifact analysis workspace Fig 20: Sample identifiers and size
Fig 05: Operating system baseline Fig 21: Isolated malware sandbox lead
Fig 06: Forensic host identity Fig 22: WebCache ESE container mapping
Fig 07: Registry timezone context Fig 23: History references to private documents
Fig 08: Local profile enumeration Fig 24: Recent Items corroborate file activity
Fig 09: Local SAM account names Fig 25: loot.lnk identifies the archive path
Fig 10: Recorded Security EVTX extraction command Fig 26: SRUM database located
Fig 11: Privileged Remote Desktop logon Fig 27: Network usage attributed to coreupdater (I)
Fig 12: Privileged account enumeration Fig 28: Network usage attributed to coreupdater (II)
Fig 13: Executable placed in System32 Fig 29: Recycle Bin review
Fig 14: First observed execution by Prefetch Fig 30: Firewall text-log availability
Fig 15: Prefetch creation in $MFT Fig 31: USN journal stream limitation
Fig 16: Service persistence in SYSTEM hive

Each plate contains an enlarged crop of an analyst-supplied screenshot. A transparent yellow background marker is applied to selected values without covering the original text pixels; the untouched screenshot remains preserved. Where a wide table must be split, separate source excerpts are labeled; they have not been composited into a new synthetic record. Artifact path, tool and interpretation accompany each plate. Screenshots are illustrative, not an independent integrity or authenticity guarantee.

Fig 01: Original E01 evidence mounted in FTK

FTK displays the named E01 as evidence, with an NTFS basic-data partition and system/user directory tree.

Figure 1

FTK Imager with 20200918_0417_DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.E01 loaded: NTFS basic-data partition and root directory tree

FTK Imager with 20200918_0417_DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.E01 loaded: NTFS basic-data partition and root directory tree
File
01-ftk-e01-mounted.png · 15.5 KB
SHA-256
459a85068f32eb90fbb63c3c0e260a10175e7abef0103050ab7730b4778675e8
Fig 01 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager 4.5.0.3
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\20200918_0417_DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.E01
Forensic significance Establishes which forensic image was browsed, but the screenshot alone cannot validate evidence integrity.
Interpretation control Source evidence filename is visible; a validated acquisition hash of this E01 has not been supplied.

Fig 02: Locally computed evidence ZIP hashes

Local SHA-256 ADE4C11A695BDCBE89D76CA0949AC918456549FCCA9E4558502FFC286C8D16AD and MD5 71C5C3509331F472ABCDF81EB6EFFF07 were calculated for the ZIP package.

Figure 2

PowerShell Get-FileHash: SHA-256 and MD5 of the DESKTOP-E01.zip package, not the E01 (user name in paths redacted)

PowerShell Get-FileHash: SHA-256 and MD5 of the DESKTOP-E01.zip package, not the E01 (user name in paths redacted)
SHA-256
f38afbaa71bc6d11de7438cb54a7e26c8e72a5b5fbef41853d20d749c3adfccd
Fig 02 Detail
Source tool Windows PowerShell 5.1 / Get-FileHash
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\DESKTOP-E01.zip
Forensic significance Records the package fingerprint for repeat comparison; not a hash of the E01 file and not verified against an acquisition manifest.
Interpretation control Original analyst screenshot already contains red markings. Yellow annotations are added on a derived view only.

Fig 03: Extracted forensic artifact inventory

The collected working set visibly contains Logs, NTFS, PerfLogs, Prefetch, SchCache, SRUM, $LogFile.copy0 (23,104 KB), $MFT.copy0 (104,960 KB), $UsnJrnl.copy0 (0 KB), Amcache.hve, SAM, SOFTWARE and SYSTEM.

Figure 3

Extracted artifact working set: $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl (0 KB), Amcache, SAM, SOFTWARE, SYSTEM (analysis-folder dates redacted)

Extracted artifact working set: $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl (0 KB), Amcache, SAM, SOFTWARE, SYSTEM (analysis-folder dates redacted)
SHA-256
a2f4b83d647c131d4bbe9b25dccaefa5866f15ecadcae65b71db91f7d8e8d6a2
Fig 03 Detail
Source tool Windows File Explorer — analyst working set
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Artifacts\ [analyst workspace; path corroborated in EVTX parser command]
Forensic significance Documents that primary Windows forensic artifact copies were assembled before parsing. File presence and listed sizes do not by themselves prove extraction completeness or original-image provenance.
Interpretation control The screenshot has no Explorer address bar. The named workspace root comes from the separate recorded EvtxECmd source path; the exact location of every listed file is not independently visible here.

Fig 04: Parsed-artifact analysis workspace

Eight analysis folders are visible: Amcache, MFT, Prefetch, Security, Shimcache, SRUM, System and WebCache.

Figure 4

The eight parsed-artifact analysis folders (modified dates redacted)

The eight parsed-artifact analysis folders (modified dates redacted)
SHA-256
700a66d2e0dcf4d6c6933a386c8d2e42850c0e2c56178845685e9100d1df4b53
Fig 04 Detail
Source tool Windows File Explorer — analyst analysis folders
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Analysis\ [analyst workspace inferred from EVTX parser output directory]
Forensic significance Documents organization of parsed outputs by artifact family, supporting repeatable review and preservation of the investigative processing trail. A folder name alone does not prove the parser completed successfully.
Interpretation control The Explorer screenshot omits the address bar; the CASE-011\Analysis parent is supported by the separately captured EVTX output path and should be treated as an analyst-path reconstruction.

Fig 05: Operating system baseline

Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation, version/build 19041, appears in the offline SOFTWARE hive.

Figure 5

Registry Explorer, SOFTWARE hive: Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation, build 19041

Registry Explorer, SOFTWARE hive: Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation, build 19041
File
05-os-baseline.png · 24.9 KB
SHA-256
e86c5efcd23fb90ff07c2023c2611fc5cf8bfbf6983334e367419941b2b0cbb9
Fig 05 Detail
Source tool Registry Explorer
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE → Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
Forensic significance Confirms the operating-system context for artifact and service interpretation.

Fig 06: Forensic host identity

The offline registry records host DESKTOP-SDN1RPT. The Security log identifies DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.C137.local.

Figure 6

SYSTEM hive ComputerName: DESKTOP-SDN1RPT

SYSTEM hive ComputerName: DESKTOP-SDN1RPT
File
06-host-identity.png · 4.7 KB
SHA-256
7a8ecaad84266f71dc33561cfbe625e634d6a498f72ba47f139db5739a72040d
Fig 06 Detail
Source tool Registry Explorer
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM → ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName
Forensic significance Scopes the findings to the acquired Windows workstation.

Fig 07: Registry timezone context

TimeZoneKeyName is Pacific Standard Time and the recorded ActiveTimeBias is 420 minutes (UTC−07:00 for the displayed setting).

Figure 7

SYSTEM hive TimeZoneInformation: Pacific Standard Time, ActiveTimeBias 420

SYSTEM hive TimeZoneInformation: Pacific Standard Time, ActiveTimeBias 420
File
07-timezone.png · 5.3 KB
SHA-256
c528447cdf2224e70f462c521ed1bd8988034c49bfb53d8e0a06927b3cc2736b
Fig 07 Detail
Source tool Registry Explorer v2026.10.2
Artifact / investigation path SYSTEM → ControlSet001\Control\TimeZoneInformation
Forensic significance Allows the analyst to avoid mixing host-local time with the UTC-normalized event and parser timeline.

Fig 08: Local profile enumeration

Profile artifacts include Administrator, Admin, Rick, and Morty identities.

Figure 8

ProfileList: ricksanchez, mortysmith, Administrator and Admin profiles

ProfileList: ricksanchez, mortysmith, Administrator and Admin profiles
File
08-profile-list.png · 17.8 KB
SHA-256
04114d0979bf5858be586c5766bd67ffd8a56c4329d23628778cebe62cbe2a5b
Fig 08 Detail
Source tool Registry Explorer
Artifact / investigation path HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList
Forensic significance Preserves account context; mere profile presence is not evidence of compromise.

Fig 09: Local SAM account names

The local SAM Names key lists Admin, Administrator, DefaultAccount, Guest and WDAGUtilityAccount.

Figure 9

SAM Names key: Admin, Administrator, DefaultAccount, Guest, WDAGUtilityAccount

SAM Names key: Admin, Administrator, DefaultAccount, Guest, WDAGUtilityAccount
File
09-sam-names.png · 7.1 KB
SHA-256
39caa18880bb0478f2129153d41dcd3aa18ee1e3c33c841c6d55492f3e87e2cc
Fig 09 Detail
Source tool Registry Explorer v2026.10.2
Artifact / investigation path SAM → SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names
Forensic significance Separates local account inventory from the separately observed C137\Administrator domain-account logon.

Fig 10: Recorded Security EVTX extraction command

The visible console shows EvtxECmd reading an extracted Security.evtx and saving the CSV at the analyst case path.

Figure 10

EvtxECmd parsing Security.evtx to Security_Analysis.csv (user name and console-log timestamp redacted)

EvtxECmd parsing Security.evtx to Security_Analysis.csv (user name and console-log timestamp redacted)
SHA-256
b6b1cd493475e18715497e14d241a7c874705a2fe58521b72d419002ec7da5fe
Fig 10 Detail
Source tool Windows PowerShell / EvtxECmd v2026.10.2
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Artifacts\Logs\Security.evtx → C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\Forensics\CASE-011\Analysis\Security\Security_Analysis.csv
Forensic significance Gives an actual observed parser command and source/output paths rather than a reconstructed command example.
Interpretation control The console also displays a privilege warning; it does not alone establish a parsing failure.

Fig 11: Privileged Remote Desktop logon

2020-09-19 03:36:24 UTC: C137\Administrator successfully logged on using LogonType 10 (RDP). Source address 10.42.85.10; LogonId 0x857E73.

Figure 11

Event 4624, record 2125: C137\Administrator, LogonType 10 from 10.42.85.10 at 2020-09-19 03:36:24 UTC

Event 4624, record 2125: C137\Administrator, LogonType 10 from 10.42.85.10 at 2020-09-19 03:36:24 UTC
File
11-rdp-logon-4624.png · 31.5 KB
SHA-256
21db388a0b8b8529c3f9b12026dfc1bb559d23061b826a210f06a0d2aa932751
Fig 11 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / EvtxECmd
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Security.evtx → Security_Analysis.csv; Event ID 4624, Record 2125
Forensic significance Establishes a privileged remote interactive session preceding malware installation, not who owned the credentials.
Interpretation control The source address is a private IP; it is not independently identified as an external attacker.

Fig 12: Privileged account enumeration

2020-09-19 03:39:58 UTC: group/account enumeration associated with the Administrator session (LogonId 0x857E73), calling process PickerHost.exe.

Figure 12

Event 4798, record 2304: group membership enumerated in the same logon session, caller PickerHost.exe

Event 4798, record 2304: group membership enumerated in the same logon session, caller PickerHost.exe
SHA-256
52be8c3488456f75b8a8224233b215a7da6f2267ad62d6b61bb25310df1c9ee7
Fig 12 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / EvtxECmd
Artifact / investigation path Security.evtx → Security_Analysis.csv; Event ID 4798, Record 2304
Forensic significance Adds a behavioral pivot during the authenticated session, but the benign/malicious intent of this event is unproven.

Fig 13: Executable placed in System32

File name coreupdater.exe, 7,168 bytes, MFT Created 2020-09-19 03:40:00 UTC; the entry remained allocated.

Figure 13

MFTECmd: coreupdater.exe in System32, 7,168 bytes, created 2020-09-19 03:40:00 UTC

MFTECmd: coreupdater.exe in System32, 7,168 bytes, created 2020-09-19 03:40:00 UTC
File
13-mft-coreupdater.png · 13.0 KB
SHA-256
0cf43c5fec599e1db2e1337929854cf14a06d28f3fe93fce561ace4ffb49611d
Fig 13 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / MFTECmd
Artifact / investigation path C:\$MFT → C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe (MFT 26213)
Forensic significance Places the suspicious executable on disk before execution and service registration.

Fig 14: First observed execution by Prefetch

RunCount=1 and LastRun=2020-09-19 03:40:49 UTC for COREUPDATER.EXE.

Figure 14

PECmd: COREUPDATER.EXE run count 1, last run 03:40:49 UTC (user name and Source Accessed time redacted)

PECmd: COREUPDATER.EXE run count 1, last run 03:40:49 UTC (user name and Source Accessed time redacted)
File
14-prefetch-run.png · 15.7 KB
SHA-256
e6e17c2b5797225a3334621b43be0856f21162bbbcb6b8466f95e2b33c29d335
Fig 14 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / PECmd
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\Prefetch\COREUPDATER.EXE-157C54BB.pf → [run time]_PECmd_Output.csv
Forensic significance Provides affirmative execution evidence; it does not specify execution command line or parent process.

Fig 15: Prefetch creation in $MFT

The Prefetch file is recorded at 2020-09-19 03:40:59 UTC and has an on-disk size of 5,343 bytes.

Figure 15

MFTECmd: COREUPDATER.EXE-157C54BB.pf created 2020-09-19 03:40:59 UTC, 5,343 bytes

MFTECmd: COREUPDATER.EXE-157C54BB.pf created 2020-09-19 03:40:59 UTC, 5,343 bytes
File
15-mft-prefetch.png · 15.9 KB
SHA-256
57ea87f4934fa5e04cb6304561a0107d6993b1d169ff920131217e2437bbcda9
Fig 15 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / MFTECmd
Artifact / investigation path C:\$MFT → C:\Windows\Prefetch\COREUPDATER.EXE-157C54BB.pf (MFT 83852)
Forensic significance Cross-validates the independent PECmd Prefetch parser result.

Fig 16: Service persistence in SYSTEM hive

An Automatic Win32OwnProcess service points to C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe. LastWrite: 03:42:42 UTC.

Source detail 1 of 2:

Figure 16a

Services\coreupdater: Automatic, Win32OwnProcess, last write 2020-09-19 03:42:42

Services\coreupdater: Automatic, Win32OwnProcess, last write 2020-09-19 03:42:42
SHA-256
c83534be826b2f4acca947a02c6d871c692baff26fc6171294c35fa67af072f7

Source detail 2 of 2:

Figure 16b

Services\coreupdater image path: C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe

Services\coreupdater image path: C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe
SHA-256
9cf3fbc9d4bf1466c5e680ce65c0a2a0e932330eff13dc6265fc691570cadc22
Fig 16 Detail
Source tool Registry Explorer
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM → ControlSet001\Services\coreupdater
Forensic significance Confirms Windows service persistence configuration.

Fig 17: Service installation event

2020-09-19 03:42:42 UTC: Service Control Manager records installation of ‘coreupdater’, Automatic start, LocalSystem service account.

Figure 17

System Event 7045, record 958: service coreupdater installed, auto start, LocalSystem (user name in path redacted)

System Event 7045, record 958: service coreupdater installed, auto start, LocalSystem (user name in path redacted)
File
17-event-7045.png · 30.1 KB
SHA-256
9d640a83a88a9aef964235d1f6a4df6c74362c82df169596d20924f90099ea85
Fig 17 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / EvtxECmd
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx → Event ID 7045, Record 958
Forensic significance Independent Windows event corroborates service-based persistence.

Fig 18: Service creation CSV cross-check

The parsed record places coreupdater service installation at 03:42:42 UTC, Auto start, LocalSystem, image C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe.

Source detail 1 of 2:

Figure 18a

Parsed 7045 row, part 1: 03:42:42 UTC, DESKTOP-SDN1RPT, Administrator SID, Name: coreupdater

Parsed 7045 row, part 1: 03:42:42 UTC, DESKTOP-SDN1RPT, Administrator SID, Name: coreupdater
File
18a-7045-row-time.png · 4.3 KB
SHA-256
71d236dbd6ba1f3ef41e0c9beb2afc1f032f926953332337319c7f2eb8da43e2

Source detail 2 of 2:

Figure 18b

Parsed 7045 row, part 2: auto start, LocalSystem, C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe

Parsed 7045 row, part 2: auto start, LocalSystem, C:\Windows\System32\coreupdater.exe
SHA-256
fb6e175c943739e05cdaf221d4d910f69ab4716e34b4cc2d7a8a8e659e9b637b
Fig 18 Detail
Source tool Timeline Explorer / EvtxECmd
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\System.evtx → parsed service-installation record
Forensic significance Makes the precise service fields legible and independently ties them to the Event 7045 detail in Fig 17.

Fig 19: Malware reputation finding

64 of 71 antivirus engines reported the submitted sample/hash as malicious at the time captured.

Figure 19

VirusTotal: 64 of 71 vendors flag coreupdater.exe as malicious

VirusTotal: 64 of 71 vendors flag coreupdater.exe as malicious
SHA-256
5c501e5c16177a40ff57ae0f9eb8a87c8371e6fee82bd3e5a595525b25bfa96f
Fig 19 Detail
Source tool VirusTotal (external reputation service)
Artifact / investigation path VirusTotal SHA-256 10f3b92002bb98467334161cf85d0b1730851f9256f83c27db125e9a0c1cfda6
Forensic significance Strong external malware corroboration, but no substitute for host-specific behavior records.

Fig 20: Sample identifiers and size

MD5 eed41b4500e473f97c50c7385ef5e374; SHA1 fd153c66386ca93ec9993d66a84d6f0d129a3a5c; SHA256 10f3b9…cfda6; size 7,168 bytes.

Figure 20

VirusTotal basic properties: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and file size 7,168 bytes

VirusTotal basic properties: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and file size 7,168 bytes
File
20-sample-hashes.png · 79.8 KB
SHA-256
05a389821b302d5fb1a2244faa5712809edd15dad1c53b9d11d89e37935e8d9d
Fig 20 Detail
Source tool VirusTotal / AmcacheParser
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve → Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv; VirusTotal sample details
Forensic significance The SHA1 matches the offline Amcache inventory for the same executable path.

Fig 21: Isolated malware sandbox lead

Sandbox behavior displays network indicator 203.78.103.109. This observation was generated in third-party sandbox infrastructure.

Figure 21

VirusTotal sandbox IP traffic: 203.78.103.109, a hunting lead only

VirusTotal sandbox IP traffic: 203.78.103.109, a hunting lead only
File
21-sandbox-ip.png · 35.7 KB
SHA-256
2877fb0ad432c6e2bdda584fd2f9834baa4462c260f2dce9905d89721002b626
Fig 21 Detail
Source tool VirusTotal sandbox analysis
Artifact / investigation path VirusTotal behavior tab for the submitted coreupdater.exe sample
Forensic significance Treat as a hunting lead only: host-to-address communication is NOT evidenced by the acquired workstation artifacts.
Interpretation control No victim-host network log independently links coreupdater.exe to 203.78.103.109.

Fig 22: WebCache ESE container mapping

Container_8 (table ID 51) maps to a History container within the Administrator profile.

Source detail 1 of 2:

Figure 22a

ESEDatabaseView Containers table: Container 8, MSHist012020091820200919

ESEDatabaseView Containers table: Container 8, MSHist012020091820200919
SHA-256
a5beaa0a975b74e6581b49e9752c3b12b3339314d1214fd3f170c565a5e7d842

Source detail 2 of 2:

Figure 22b

Container 8 directory: Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History

Container 8 directory: Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History
SHA-256
8d94bcc812a6e7f27dc8ac38dcb7f5c0e8d68e46ef32f2dfddf01235f13a3342
Fig 22 Detail
Source tool ESEDatabaseView (NirSoft)
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat → Containers table
Forensic significance Provides provenance for the subsequent local-file History entries.

Fig 23: History references to private documents

History entries refer to file:///C:/Users/mortysmith/Documents/My Social Security Number.txt, Plans.txt, Portal_gun.png, loot.zip, and Thoughts.txt.

Figure 23

Container_8 history: file:/// references to mortysmith documents, including loot.zip

Container_8 history: file:/// references to mortysmith documents, including loot.zip
SHA-256
46aed8c9e2a92073bc9b765d8ed6349cb470f62c0ee0e2c129da5f139dd529bf
Fig 23 Detail
Source tool ESEDatabaseView (NirSoft)
Artifact / investigation path WebCacheV01.dat → Container_8 / URL column → WebCache_Container8.txt
Forensic significance Shows access/history references within the Administrator WebCache; does not establish how the files were copied or transmitted.

Fig 24: Recent Items corroborate file activity

Recent shortcuts include loot.lnk, My Social Security Number.lnk, Plans.lnk, Portal_gun.lnk and Thoughts.lnk around 03:45–03:47 UTC.

Figure 24

Administrator Recent folder: loot.lnk, My Social Security Number.lnk, Plans.lnk, Portal_gun.lnk, Thoughts.lnk

Administrator Recent folder: loot.lnk, My Social Security Number.lnk, Plans.lnk, Portal_gun.lnk, Thoughts.lnk
File
24-recent-lnk.png · 20.4 KB
SHA-256
526c05b3a42b98ffd2fd4ce6fb5bde5830c17f22dd1ff7cefa421d34867fe73f
Fig 24 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager 4.5.0.3
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.lnk
Forensic significance Corroborates evidence of interaction with the named files in the Administrator context.

Fig 25: loot.lnk identifies the archive path

The UTF-16 target path in the shortcut resolves to C:\Users\mortysmith\Documents\loot.zip. Link metadata reports an archive target of 131,041 bytes.

Figure 25

loot.lnk bytes in FTK Imager: target C:\Users\mortysmith\Documents\loot.zip

loot.lnk bytes in FTK Imager: target C:\Users\mortysmith\Documents\loot.zip
File
25-loot-lnk-hex.png · 15.7 KB
SHA-256
dfababfbc05c06f32020de5a5fdfd19ae7b3dde7f88ca128a894ce49b47b6e12
Fig 25 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager / Shell Link byte inspection
Artifact / investigation path C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\loot.lnk
Forensic significance Strong evidence the archive path existed/referenced at shortcut creation; its original contents were not recovered.
Interpretation control Shortcut metadata is not a copy of loot.zip and is not proof of outbound transfer.

Fig 26: SRUM database located

The live-system SRUM ESE database and related logs were located in the image.

Figure 26

FTK Imager: SRUDB.dat in C:\Windows\System32\sru

FTK Imager: SRUDB.dat in C:\Windows\System32\sru
File
26-srum-database.png · 24.5 KB
SHA-256
cd97a85a2e46ac5a99f31b6b0c909eb66f7a9651503fd50e9b7fd3eae2d3bd4b
Fig 26 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager 4.5.0.3
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat
Forensic significance Documents the source artifact parsed by SrumECmd.

Fig 27: Network usage attributed to coreupdater (I)

04:14 UTC bucket: coreupdater.exe, Administrator SID, 222,046 bytes sent; 333,817 bytes received.

Figure 27

SrumECmd record 190: coreupdater.exe, 04:14 UTC bucket, 222,046 bytes sent, 333,817 received

SrumECmd record 190: coreupdater.exe, 04:14 UTC bucket, 222,046 bytes sent, 333,817 received
File
27-srum-record-190.png · 14.8 KB
SHA-256
5c4465f361d1a100f4850105355e9f376a9016ee56a310db1e236f72dcf2ae6e
Fig 27 Detail
Source tool SrumECmd / Timeline Explorer
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat + SOFTWARE → SrumECmd_NetworkUsages_Output.csv, Id 190
Forensic significance Confirms application-attributed interface activity, not destination, protocol, remote transfer or exact connection moment.

Fig 28: Network usage attributed to coreupdater (II)

05:14 UTC bucket: coreupdater.exe, Administrator SID, 26,570 bytes sent; 170,146 bytes received.

Figure 28

SrumECmd record 193: coreupdater.exe, 05:14 UTC bucket, 26,570 bytes sent, 170,146 received

SrumECmd record 193: coreupdater.exe, 05:14 UTC bucket, 26,570 bytes sent, 170,146 received
File
28-srum-record-193.png · 14.7 KB
SHA-256
13843837f4d61083110814989b4da693e7aec7cf690e242ebf9dbbcd90abbbfd
Fig 28 Detail
Source tool SrumECmd / Timeline Explorer
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat + SOFTWARE → SrumECmd_NetworkUsages_Output.csv, Id 193
Forensic significance The two recorded buckets total 248,616 sent bytes and 503,963 received bytes, but do not by themselves prove exfiltration.

Fig 29: Recycle Bin review

The user SID folders visible during triage did not contain recoverable loot.zip entries.

Figure 29

$Recycle.Bin SID folders, with no loot.zip entry

$Recycle.Bin SID folders, with no loot.zip entry
File
29-recycle-bin.png · 12.7 KB
SHA-256
2cf63d2454c424802592d3c17149b4082958274ed90a33d36a80b5f477c4dd58
Fig 29 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager 4.5.0.3
Artifact / investigation path C:\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-*
Forensic significance Negative recovery result for this inspected artifact; absence does not establish secure deletion.

Fig 30: Firewall text-log availability

The firewall LogFiles\Firewall directory appears empty in the acquired image.

Figure 30

LogFiles\Firewall directory, empty: no pfirewall.log

LogFiles\Firewall directory, empty: no pfirewall.log
SHA-256
048dab4104f0973f0e67827b2c909775276d15313c8c3fc040ccda6125edf9c7
Fig 30 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager 4.5.0.3
Artifact / investigation path C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log
Forensic significance A network destination cannot be recovered from a text log that is not present.

Fig 31: USN journal stream limitation

The FTK properties pane reports Alternate Data Stream Count=2 while the unnamed file stream has size 0. The $J stream was not recovered in this workflow.

Figure 31

$UsnJrnl properties: size 0, Alternate Data Stream Count 2; $J not recovered

$UsnJrnl properties: size 0, Alternate Data Stream Count 2; $J not recovered
File
31-usnjrnl.png · 9.8 KB
SHA-256
7ed7337ba08c5545c95ecac1b7e51b2a3e8dc965a78a9e3d3aaa7a0aa7037028
Fig 31 Detail
Source tool FTK Imager 4.5.0.3
Artifact / investigation path C:\$Extend\$UsnJrnl; desired $DATA stream: C:\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J
Forensic significance No $UsnJrnl analysis was available to confirm deletion/rename operations for loot.zip.

13. Reproducibility appendix: export names

Supplied export or artifact Role / source
MFT_Analysis.csv MFTECmd output for offline NTFS $MFT; 132,615 lines in analyst view.
CASE-011\Artifacts inventory File Explorer capture documents $MFT.copy0, $LogFile.copy0, $UsnJrnl.copy0, SAM/SOFTWARE/SYSTEM, Amcache.hve and source artifact folders (Fig 03).
CASE-011\Analysis inventory File Explorer capture documents Amcache, MFT, Prefetch, Security, Shimcache, SRUM, System and WebCache analysis subfolders (Fig 04).
Security_Analysis.csv EvtxECmd output from Security.evtx; 2,457 event rows in analyst view.
[run time]_PECmd_Output.csv Prefetch parsing output used for one recorded run.
[run time]_Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv Amcache file inventory; same SHA1 as sample.
[run time]_Windows10C_11_SYSTEM_AppCompatCache.csv Compatibility cache review, no coreupdater hit in supplied export.
[run time]_SrumECmd_NetworkUsages_Output.csv Two process-attributed SRUM network usage records.
WebCacheV01.dat; V01*.log; V01.chk Extracted ESE database and transactional companion logs.
WebCache_Container8.txt ESEDatabaseView table export of Administrator history.
loot.lnk; Plans.lnk; Portal_gun.lnk; Thoughts.lnk; My Social Security Number.lnk Extracted shortcut evidence, not contents of referenced target files.
Analyst screenshot series Analyst UI record; the tool and artifact path of each are given in its plate.
DESKTOP-E01.zip — SHA256/MD5 local hashes Calculated in PowerShell; fingerprints of ZIP package only, no comparison to original forensic acquisition manifest.

Interpretation and preservation notes

  • Do not conflate historical target timestamps (2020) with case-analysis/export timestamps.
  • Do not conflate VirusTotal sandbox behavior with endpoint-observed network destinations.
  • Do not conflate target filename/size recorded in .lnk with independently recovered ZIP content.
  • Do not infer an unobservable transfer from SRUM aggregate bytes or from missing local logs.
  • Do not treat locally recorded hashes of DESKTOP-E01.zip as a verified original acquisition digest for 20200918_0417_DESKTOP-SDN1RPT.E01.
  • Protect the user’s private documents and identifiers during broader distribution; this report omits actual sensitive values.

All work

Index · Turki Adnan Abbas

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